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WHOSE BABY ARE YOU ADOPTING?
A CRITIQUE OF THE MASSACHUSETTS
ADOPTION LAWS
I. INTRODUCTION
In August 1976, Hazel and Theodore Mohr adopted Elizabeth, an eight
year-old child inthe custody of the Massachusetts Department of Social Services

(DSS).' The social worker assigned to handle Elizabeth's adoption told the
Mohrs that Elizabeth was small for her age due to malnutrition. 2 She also
informed them that Elizabeth's mother "had blond hair, blue eyes ...was 5 foot,
1 inch tall, and 130 pounds. ..." At probate court, the social worker filed a
petition stating that the mother was in good health, but unable to take care of
Elizabeth.4
When Elizabeth turned sixteen, her adoptive parents brought her to a
neurologist with hope of understanding her strange, schizophrenic-like

Mohrv. Commonwealth, 421 Mass. 147, 152,653 N.E.2d 1104, 1107 (1995). The
Mohrs contacted the Department of Social Services approximately five years prior to
adopting Elizabeth. Mohr, 421 Mass. at 150, 653 N.E.2d at 1107. In the adoption
application, the Mohrs specified that they were willing to consider a child with an
"emotional problem" or a "correctable medical problem," but not a child with "special
needs." Id.at 151 n.5,653 N.E.2d at 1107 n.5. The Department made the Mohrs aware
of the adoption subsidy available to adoptive parents of 'special needs' children, but the
Mohrs still declined. Id.; see MAss. REGS. CODE tit. 110, § 7.209 (1993) (describing the
criteria and requirements of financial assistance for adoptive families of "special needs'
children). As a side note, the Mohrs sued the Commonwealth instead of the Department
because the Department constitutes an agency of the Commonwealth. MAss. GEN. L. ch.
258, § 10(b) (1994).
2 Mohr, 421 Mass. at 151, 653 N.E.2d at 1107. The social worker, Pamela
Tompkins, also told the Mohrs that the Department of Social Services had no information
about the biological father. Id. at 151,653 N.E.2d at 1107. She explained that Elizabeth
had lived with a foster family for several years, but alleged abuse prompted the Department
of Social Services to remove her. Id.
3Mohr, 421 Mass. at 151, 653 N.E.2d at 1107. No other information was given to
the Mohrs about the biological mother. Id. The social worker indicated that the
Department of Social Services did not have any medical information about the child. Id.
4 Mohr, 421 Mass. at 154, 653 N.E.2d at 1108. The petition also stated that
Elizabeth "was developing below average due to environmental deprivation, but had
potential for further development." Id.
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behavior.5 To complete the proper tests, the neurologist needed a copy of
Elizabeth's immunization records, which were on file with her pediatrician.6
This file included all the information known to DSS at the time of Elizabeth's
adoption.7 In the course of transferring these records, the Mohrs read the file
and, inadvertently, discovered that Elizabeth's biological mother was committed
to Worcester State Hospital for schizophrenic.' Further, they learned that
neurologists at Springfield Hospital had performed four evaluations on Elizabeth
and diagnosed her with moderate cerebral atrophy and mental retardation. 9
Lastly, the Mohrs learned that Elizabeth's physician strongly advised against her
adoption until he could further evaluate and diagnose her mental and physical
disabilities." The social worker and DSS possessed this vital information at the
time of Elizabeth's adoption but chose not to reveal it to the Mohrs.II The Mohrs

' Mohr, 421 Mass. at 152, 653 N.E.2d at 1107. Elizabeth displayed strange,
schizophrenic-like behavior her entire life. Id. It is important to note that the Mohrs were
aware that Elizabeth was about two years developmentally delayed and of low intelligence
because they took her to a pediatrician before finalizing the adoption. Id. That
examination, however, did not explain Elizabeth's strange behavior. Id.
' Mohr v. Commonwealth, 421 Mass 147, 152, 653 N.E.2d 1104, 1107 (1995)
7 Mohr, 421 Mass. at 152-53, 653 N.E.2d at 1107-08.
' Mohr, 421 Mass. at 153, 653 N.E.2d at 1108. The biological mother had a below
average IQ score of 83. Id.At trial, an expert testified that the children of schizophrenic
parents are fifteen times more likely to develop schizophrenia than the children of
non-schizophrenic parents. Id. He also stated that this fact is commonly known among
practitioners in the field of mental retardation and mental illness. Id.
' Mohr,421 Mass. at 154,653 N.E.2d at 1108. After the first evaluation, at eighteen
weeks, the doctor concluded that development was not satisfactory. Id. at 153,653 N.E.2d
at 1108. The second evaluation, at thirty-nine weeks, revealed that her general
developmental level equaled twenty-four weeks. Id.After ten months, a neurologist stated
that Elizabeth "show[ed] definite evidence of retarded growth and development of an
unknown etiology." Id at 154, 654 N.E.2d at 1108. At the age of one year, neurological
tests indicated that Elizabeth had moderate cerebral atrophy. Id.
'0Mohr,421 Mass. at 154, 653 N.E.2d at 1108. The Department of Social Services
did not heed the doctor's recommendation and sent Elizabeth to the Nazareth Child Care
Center toprepare for adoption. Id. at 150, 154, 654 N.E.2d at 1107, 1108. She arrived at
the Center with the diagnosis of "failure to thrive. . . due to environmental deprivation."
Id.
at 150,653 N.E.2d at 1106-07. The Mohrs did not know about this diagnosis prior to
adoption. Id. at 153, 653 N.E.2d at 1108.
" Mohr, 421 Mass. at 154, 653 N.E.2d at 1108. At trial, the defendants explained
the non-disclosure decision as being in accordance with Massachusetts' child adoption
procedure. Id. at 165, 653 N.E.2d at 1114. The Massachusetts legislature mandates the
DSS to release "relevant information about the child to enable [the] adoptive parent to
knowledgeably determine whether to accept the child for adoption." MASS. REGS. CODE
tit. 110, § 7.213 (1993). Furthermore, the corresponding statute allows the adoption
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sued DSS in Superior Court for negligent misrepresentation hoping to recover
enough money to finance Elizabeth's care. 2
At trial, the Mohrs admitted they would not have adopted Elizabeth had
DSS fully disclosed the known medical information about Elizabeth and her
mother.' The jury returned a verdict for the Mohrs and awarded them $3.8
million, which the Superior Court later reduced to $200,000. The Supreme
Judicial Court affirmed the Superior Court's decision, officially recognizing
'wrongful adoption' in Massachusetts. 5
As a result of Mohr v.

agencies to release information concerning the medical, ethnic, socioeconomic, and
educational circumstances of the biological parents, as long as the information does not
identify the biological parents. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 210, §5 D (1995). Nothing in the statute
specifically states that the agency must disclose the results of the mental evaluation
performed on Elizabeth. Id.
12 Mohr, 421 Mass. at 155, 653 N.E.2d at 1109. At the time of trial, Elizabeth was
nineteen years old and unable to take care of herself. Id. at 155, 653 N.E.2d at 1108. In
defense of the claim of fraud, the defendants attempted to characterize the decision not to
disclose a "discretionary act" which is shielded by the Massachusetts Torts Claims Act.
MASS. GEN. L. ch. 258, § 10 (b);Mohr, 421 Mass. at 165, 653 N.E.2d at 1114. This
section of the Massachusetts Tort claims Act exempts from liability the actions of state
employees which require "a high degree of discretion and judgment involved in weighing
alternatives and making choices with respect to public policy and planning." Mohr, 421
Mass. at 165,653 N.E.2d at 1114 (quoting Whitneyv. Worcester, 373 Mass. 208, 218, 366
N.E.2d 1210, 1216 (1977)). The court disagreed with this argument, holding the social
worker's actions were not protected acts since they did not require "a high degree of
discretion" and did not effect "public policy and planning." Id.
"3 Mohr, 421 Mass. at 155, 653 N.E.2d at 1108. At trial, an expert witness
established that the Mohrs could have determined that Elizabeth would never reach
"normal cognitive development ... [or] normal emotional status" at the time of the
adoption. Id. at 153 n.6, 653 N.E.2d at 1108 n.6. The court refused to impose an
affirmative duty on the adoptive parents to investigate the mental and emotional health of
the child and her biological parents. Id. at 163 n. 12, 653 N.E.2d at 1112 n. 12. In the eyes
of the Supreme Judicial Court, this information should be gathered and disseminated by the
adoption agency. Id. at 162, 653 N.E.2d at 1112.
,4 Mohr, 421 Mass. at 149 n.4, 653 N.E.2d at 1106 n.4. The court granted the
Commonwealth's motion to decrease the judgment to $100,000 per plaintiff, in reliance on
the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act. Id. The Tort Claims Act states, in relevant part:
Public employers shall be liable for injury . . . caused by the negligent or

wrongful act or omission of any public employee while acting within the
scope of his.

. .

employment . . . in the same manner and to the same

extent as a private individual under like circumstances, except that public
employers . . . shall not be liable.

. .

hundred thousand dollars.
MASS. GEN. L. ch. 258, § 2 (1988).
"5421 Mass. 147, 653 N.E.2d 1104 (1995).

for any amount in excess of one
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Commonwealth," all adoption agencies in Massachusetts must disclose all
'nonidentifying' information about the child and the child's biological parents,
or risk liability for negligent and intentional misrepresentation. 7 In the opinion,
Chief Justice Liacos explained that wrongful adoption does not create a new
cause of action, rather it extends common law fraud to include these cases.' 8
II. HISTORY OF WRONGFUL ADOPTION

Massachusetts follows eight other states in holding adoption agencies liable
for misrepresenting information regarding the adoptee or the child's biological
parents. 9 In 1986, the Supreme Court of Ohio in Burr v. Board of County

16

421 Mass. 147, 653 N.E.2d 104 (1995).

Id. at 162-63, 653 N.E.2d at 1112-13; see supra text accompanying note 11,
(outlining the Code of Massachusetts Regulations governing DSS). The Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts agreed with the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Burr v. Board
ofCounty Comm 'rs,which held that it "would be a travesty ofjustice and distortion of the
truth to conclude that deceitful placement of this infant . . . was not actionable when the
tragic but hidden realities of the child's infirmities finally came to light." 23 Ohio St. 3d
69, 75, 491 N.E.2d 1101, 1107 (1986); see also Roe v. Catholic Charities, 225 Ill. App.
3d 519, 524, 588 N.E.2d 354, 357 (1992) (stating wrongful adoption as an "extension of
common law fraud" and fulfills the needs of society).
' Mohr, 421 Mass. at 161, 653 N.E.2d at 1112. According to the Restatement of
17

Torts, misrepresentation is fraudulent if the source: "(a) knows or believes that the matter
is not as he represents it to be, (b) does not have the confidence in the accuracy of this
representation that he states or implies, or (c) knows that he does not have the basis for his
representation that he states or implies." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 526 (1977).
Accordingly, "the standard of conduct to which ... [an adoption agency] must conform to
avoid being negligent is that of a reasonable . . . [adoption agency] under like
circumstances." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 283 (1965).
'9 Mohr, 421 Mass. at 161, 652 N.E.2d at 1112 (1995), the eight states that
Massachusetts follows are as follows, California, Illinois, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
New Mexico, Rhode Island, Wisconsin; see Michael J. v. County of Los Angeles, Dep't of
Adoptions, 201 Cal. App. 3d 859, 875, 247 Cal. Rptr. 514, 513 (1988) (holding the agency
liable for not disclosing information about a degenerative nerve disorder); Roe, 225 Ill. App.
3d at 519, 588 N.E.2d at 357 (finding the agency liable for not revealing details of the
childrens' psychotic behavior); M.H. and J.L.H v. Caritas Family Servs., 488 N.W.2d 282,
288 (1992) (holding the agency liable for not clarifying that the adoptee's parents were
siblings); Juman v. Louise Wise Servs., 620 N.Y.S. 2d 371, 372 (1995) (determining that
the agency was liable for not explaining the adoptee's severe psychiatric history); Burr, 23
Ohio St. 3d at 75, 491 N.E.2d at 1107 (establishing agency liability for not divulging
information about the adoptee's premature birth); Gibbs v. Ernst, 150 Pa. Commw. 154,
160, 615 A.2d 851, 854 (1992) (holding the agency liable for withholding information
about adoptee's ten prior foster care placements); Mallette v. Children's Friend and Servs.,
61 A.2d 67, 71 (1995) (finding the agency liable for not indicating the child's mental
handicap to the adoptive parents); Meracle v. Children's Serv. Soc'y, 149 Wis. 2d 19, 32,
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Commissioners,' became the first state supreme court to acknowledge that
adoption agencies owe a duty to disclose certain information to adoptive
parents.2' The Supreme Court of Ohio ruled that adoption agencies were only
liable for intentional, fraudulent statements about the adoptive child and
biological parents. 2
Under Burr, an adoption agency's negligent
misrepresentations would not create a liability.23
In the years following the Burrdecision, six states acknowledged 'wrongful

437 N.W.2d 532, 537 (1989) (finding the agency liable after it misrepresented the adoptive
child's potential to contract Huntington's disease).
20 23 Ohio St. 3d 69, 491 N.E.2d 1101 (1986).
2 Burr, 23 Ohio St. 3d at 75, 491 N.E.2d at 1107. This was not the first time
adoptive parents sued an adoption agency for misrepresentation, but the first time a court
allowed recovery. See Richard P. v. Vista Del Mar Child Care Sew., 106 Cal. App. 3d 860,
866, 165 Cal. Rptr. 370, 371 (1980) (judgmententered for adoption agency ). In Richard
P., the adoptive parents unsuccessfully sued the adoption agency for breach of contract and
breach of warranty when they realized the agency informed them that their adopted son was
"in excellent health," when actually he was born prematurely. Id. at 866, 165 Cal. Rptr. at
373. The court refrained from holding the agency liable, stating that it did not intend to
make the "adoption agency a guarantor of the infant's future good heath." Id. at 867, 165
Cal. Rptr. at 374. The RichardP.court found liability unreasonable because natural parents
have no guarantee for the physical and emotional health of their children. Id.
2 Burr, 23 Ohio St. 3d at 75, 491 N.E.2d at 1107. In Burr, the employee of the
Stark County Welfare Department told the Russell and Betty Burr that their adopted son
was born to an eighteen-year old unwed mother and the matemal grandparents were mean
to the child. Id. at 70, 491 N.E.2d at 1103. The Burrs adopted Patrick and eventually
discovered that Patrick's biological mother was a committed mental patient. 1d. at 71, 491
N.E.2d at 1104. The Welfare Department fabricated every detail about Patrick. Id. at 71,
491 N.E.2d at 1103-04; see also Claire Grandpre' Combs, Note, Wrongful Adoption:
Adoption Agency Held Liablefor FraudulentRepresentations:Burr v. Stark County Board

of Commissioners, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 343, 352 (1986) (analyzing first successful wrongful
adoption decision in the United States).
" Burr, 23 Ohio St. 3d at 76-77, 491 N.E.2d at 1108. Recovery for the adoptive
parents depends on whether the adoptive parents can prove fraud, as set out in Cohen v.
Lamko, Inc. 10 Ohio St. 3d 167, 169,462 N.E.2d 407, 409 (1984). According to Cohen,
the elements of fraud are:
(a) a representation or, where there is a duty to disclose, concealment of a
fact, (b) which is material to the transaction at hand, (c) made falsely, with
knowledge of its falsity, or with such utter disregard and recklessness as to
whether it is true or false that knowledge made be inferred, (d) with the
intent of misleading another into relying upon it, (e) justifiable reliance
upon the representation or concealment, and (f) a resulting injury
proximately caused by the reliance.
Cohen, 10 Ohio St. 3d at 169, 462 N.E.2d at 409 (citing Friedland v. Lipman, 68
Ohio App. 2d 255, 259, 429 N.E.2d 456, 459 (1980)).
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adoption' as a cause of action.24 In 1988, the Second District Court of Appeals
for California expanded the rights of the adoptive parents by requiring a good
faith, full disclosure of the adopted child's medical history.' The California
court, however, followed the Burr decision in refusing to impose liability for
negligent misrepresentation.26
In 1989, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in Meracle v. Children's
Service Society,27 ratified an adoption agency's liability for intentional
misrepresentation of the adopted child's background. The Meracle court also
established that adoption agencies could avoid liability by not making any
affirmative representations regarding the child or the biological parents.2 The
Meracle decision, unlike the Burrdecision, discouraged communication between
adoptive parents and adoption agencies.3 ° After Meracle, Wisconsin adoption

24

Michael J. v. County of Los Angles, Dep't of Adoption, 201 Cal. App. 3d 859,

872, 247 Cal. Rptr. 504, 512 (1988); Roe v. Catholic Charities, 225 Ill. App. 3d 519, 524,
588 N.E.2d 354, 357 (1986); Juman v. Louise Wise Servs., 620 N.Y.S. 2d 282, 372
(1992); Gibbs v. Ernst, 150 Pa. Commw. 154 160, 615 A.2d 851, 854 (1992); M.H. and
J.L.H. v. Caritas Family Servs., 488 N.W.2d 282, 288 (1992); Mallette, v. Children's
Friend and Serv., 661 A.2d 67, 71 (1989); Meracle v. Children's Serv. Soc'y, 149 Wis.
2d 19, 32, 437 N.W.2d 532, 537 (1989).
2' MichaelJ., 201 Cal. App. 3d at 875, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 513. The adoptive parents
sued a private adoption agency for failing to disclose that their adopted son had a congenital
degenerative nerve disorder at the time of the adoption. Id. at 863-64, 247 Cal. Rptr. at
505. The court imposed liability because the California Legislature recognized that
"adopting parent[s] need complete medical background information on both the adoptee and
the adoptee's birth parents." Id. at 872, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 5 11; CAL. [FAMILY] CODE § 9202
(West 1994).
' Michael J., 210 Cal. App. 3d at 874-75, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 513. The court made
clear that liability for negligence would "impede the proper functioning of adoption
agencies." Id. at 873,247 Cal. Rptr. at 512 (quoting Smith v. Alameda County Social Serv.
Agency, 90 Cal. App. 3d 929, 938, 153 Cal. Rptr. 712, 716 (1979)).
"

149 Wis. 2d 19, 437 N.W.2d 532 (1989).

2

Id. at 32, 437 N.W.2d at 537.

' Id. The Meracle court established that if the agency releases any information about
the child or the biological parents, it must assure a complete, and accurate disclosure. Id.
In this case, the adoption agency told Quentin and Nancy Meracle that Erin, the child they
wanted to adopt, had a history of Huntington's Disease in her family. Id. at 23, 437
N.W.2d at 533. The Meracles were notified that her father had tested negatively for this

disease, giving Erin no greater than normal chance of developing Huntington's Disease.
Id. Several years after the adoption, the parents realized that Erin had Huntington's Disease
and that no test existed to diagnosis this illness. Meracle, 149 Wis. at 23, 437 N.W.2d at
533.
30 Burr v. Board of Comm'rs, 23 Ohio St. 3d 69, 76-77, 491 N.E.2d 1104, 1108
(1986).
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agencies have no duty to disclose health information to potential adoptive
parents.3 ' Proponents of the Meracle decision believe this ruling would give
adoptive parents more confidence in the adoption process because liability will
attach if a court finds error in any of the agency's assertions about the child. 2
In 1992, the Appellate Court of Illinois expanded the parameters of
'wrongful adoption' by allowing adoptive parents to recover damages after an
adoption agency negligently misrepresented the history of several adopted
children. The Illinois court explained that adoption agencies owe adoptive
parents and children a duty of care because the agency is the only party in the
transaction able to accurately collect and convey information about the child.34

III. WRONGFUL ADOPTION IN MASSACHUSETTS
Although other states since Illinois have recognized wrongful adoption, no
decision has expanded the liability for wrongful adoption as far as Mohr v.

Commonwealth.3" In Mohr, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

established that all adoption agencies have an affirmative duty to disclose all
'nonidentifying' information to the adoptive parents. 6 Additionally, the court
held that adoptive parents do not have a duty to investigate the child's

"' Meracle v. Children's Serv. Soc'y, 149 Wis. 2d 19, 32, 437 N.W.2d 532, 537
(1989).
2 Meracle, 149 Wis. 2d at 32, 437 N.W.2d at 537. Accordingly, the court suggested
that encouraging silence would not result in greater instances of fraud on the part of the
adoption agencies. Id.; see also Foster v. Bass, 575 So. 2d 967, 981 (1980).
' Roe v. Catholic Charities, 225 M.App. 3d 519, 538, 588 N.E.2d 354, 366 (1992).
The court stated this rule would further strengthen and preserve the families. Id. at 537,
588 N.E.2d at 365. In this case, the adoption agency told three different families that the
potentially adoptive children were normal, but "needed lots of love." Id. at 523, 588
N.E.2d at 356. All three sets of adoptive parents incurred high medical bills for psychiatric
treatment for these children who displayed violent and bizarre behavior, such as cutting the
whiskers off of the family cat, flattening the tires of the parent's car, and exposing
themselves to the neighbors. Id. The adoption agency admitted that, at the time of the
adoptions, they knew that all three children had received treatment for psychological and
emotional problems. Id.
' Roe, 225 111. App. at 537, 588 N.E.2d at 365.
3- Mohr, 421 Mass. 147, 161, 653 N.E.2d 1104, 1112; see Mallette v. Children's
Friend and Serv., 661 A. 2d 67, 73 (1995) (holding that adoption agencies must make
representations about children in a "nonnegligent manner"); M.H and J.L.H. v. Caritas
Family Serv., 488 N.W.2d 282, 288 (1992) (declining to hold an adoption agency liable
intentional misrepresentation).
' Mohr v. Commonwealth, 421 Mass. 147, 161,653 N.E.2d 1104,1112 (1995).
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background.37
Prior to the Mohr's lawsuit, no other adoptive family had successfully
contested the fraudulent behavior of a Massachusetts adoption agency.3
Interestingly, before the Mohr decision, the Massachusetts judiciary provided
redress to families harmed by the negligent conduct of other family planning
professionals.39 For example, in Burke v. Rivo4° the court allowed the parents
of a healthy child to recover from a physician who negligently performed a
sterilization procedure resulting in an unwanted pregnancy. 4 The Burke court
determined damages by adding the costs associated with recovering from an
unsuccessful medical procedure with the cost of giving birth and raising the
child.42 The court then subtracted a dollar amount which represented the benefit
43
the plaintiffs would receive by having the child as part of their family.
In the same year as the Burke decision, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts allowed the parents of a severely disabled child to recover from
a physician who gave negligent preconception genetic counseling."4 In Viccaro
37 Id., at 162, 653 N.E.2d at 1112. The holding of a lack of duty on the
part of the
parents prevents adoption agencies from using comparative negligence as a defense. Id. At
trial, the Commonwealth unsuccessfully counterclaimed comparative negligence because
the Mohrs failed to discover Elizabeth's disability independently. Id.
- Id., at 161,653 N.E.2d at 1112. The court, however, acknowledges the "necessity
to approaching slowly any attempt to make an adoption agency liable" for the health of
adopted children. Mohr, 421 Mass. at 162,653 N.E.2d at 1112 (quoting Foster v. Bass,
575 So. 2d 967, 981 (1980)).
" Viccaro v. Milunsky, 406 Mass. 777, 781-82, 551 N.E.2d 8, 11 (1990) (allowing
recovery from a negligent surgeon); Burke v. Rivo, 406 Mass. 764, 768-69, 551 N.E.2d 1,
4-5 (1990) (awarding damages caused by the advice of a negligent doctor).
" 406 Mass. 764, 551 N.E.2d 1 (1990).
4' Burke, 406 Mass. at 764, 551 N.E.2d at 3. The court allowed the couple to recover
the cost of the unsuccessful sterilization procedure and the costs directly attributable to the
pregnancy. Id. The defendant unsuccessfully appealed the trial court's measure of
damages, which entailed subtracting the benefit the family would gain by having the child
from the amount the family spent on having the child, and will spend raising the child. Id.
at 772, 551 N.E.2d at 6.
42 Burke, 406 Mass. at 764, 551 N.E.2d at 3.

Burke, 421 Mass. at 772, 551 N.E.2d at 6. The dissenting justices in Burke,
criticized this process of measuring damages. Id. at 773-74, 551 N.E.2d 6-7 (O'Connor,
J., dissenting with whom Justices Nolan and Lynch join). The Justices inquired into the
value of a child to his parents is "inconsistent with the dignity that the Commonwealth,
including its courts, must accord to every human life, and it should not be permitted." Id.
at 774, 551 N.E.2d at 7 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
44 Viccaro, 406 Mass at 781-82, 551 N.E.2d at 11-12. As inBurke, the plaintiffs in
Viccaro, recovered costs associated with raising a physically and mentally disabled child,
including damages from emotional distress, offset by the benefit the family will have by the
43
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v. Milunsky, the plaintiffs consulted the physician to determine the chance of
having a handicapped child because a rare genetic disease ran in their family.4"
The Viccaros followed the advise of the physician and gave birth to a
handicapped child' Although other states label such claims 'wrongful birth' 47
or 'wrongful life,' the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts finds nothing
wrong with the birth or the life of a child and refrains from using these labels.49
In determining the award the Viccaro's would receive, the court engaged in
an analysis similar to that of Burke and focused on the "physical, emotional and
financial well-being" of the parents instead of the poor health of the child., As
in Burke, the plaintiffs in Viccaro recovered costs associated with raising a
physically and mentally disabled child, including damages for emotional distress,
offset by an amount representing the benefit the plaintiffs would receive by

existence of the child. Id.
4s

Viccaro, 406 Mass at 781-82, 551 N.E.2d at 11-12.

4

Id. at 781-82, 551 N.E.2d at 11-12.

Lininger v. Eisenbaum, 764 P.2d 1202, 1204 (Colo. 1988) (declaring a 'wrongful
birth' claim valid cause of action). In that case, the court found the physician negligent by
not warning plaintiffs of the chances of having a handicapped child. Id. The term
'wrongful birth' describes a medical malpractice claim brought by parents of a child with
an impairment or a birth defect caused by the negligence of the physician. Id.
47

- Lininger, 764 P.2d at 1204. 'Wrongful life' refers to a medical malpractice claim
in which a child claims that but for the negligence of the physician he would not have to
suffer through life because he was born with an impairment. Id. The Lininger opinion
claimed that the analysis and introspection required to answer the question "what is the
value of non-existence?" is "too metaphysical to be understood within the confines of the
law." Id. at 1210. The court also explained that both 'wrongful life' and 'wrongful birth'
are not torts on their own, but actually claims of negligence. Lininger, 764 P.2d at 1205.
In the dissent on the wrongful life discussion in Lininger, the judge complained that the
term "wrongful birth is a misnomer" because it does not describe the tort, only the result.
Id. at 1213 (Erickson, J., concurring and dissenting).
Contrary to Massachusetts, many states decline to recognize the tort of 'wrongful life'
because it requires a judge or a jury to determine the value of the disabled child's life and
compare that amount with the value to the child of not being born. Id. at 1210; see, e.g.,
Elliot v. Brown, 361 So. 2d 546, 548 (Ala. 1978) (holding that there is no legal right not
to be born); Moores v. Lucas, 405 So. 2d 1022, 1024-25 (Fla. App. 1981) (holding that
there is no cause of action for wrongful life for a child born with a genetic defect because
a physician failed to diagnose a disease); Siemieniec v. Lutheran General Hospital, 117 111.
2d 230, 232, 512 N.E.2d 691, 695 (1987) (rejecting a wrongful life claim made by child
born with hemophilia).
4' See Vicarro v. Milunsky, 406 Mass. 777, 778 n.3, 551 N.E.2d 1, 8 n.3 (stating that
the court only perceived the wrongfulness in "the negligence of the physician").

' See supra notes 41, 44 and accompanying text.
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having the child as part of their family.5" The Mohr court employed analogous
reasoning in awarding damages to the Mohrs to help them afford the expensive
medical and education services that Elizabeth requires.52 The Mohr court,
however, did not condone the 'offset method' in determining the damage award
in wrongful adoption cases.

IV. PRESENT ADOPTION GUIDELINES IN MASSACHUSETIS
Massachusetts statutes and regulations regarding adoption govern private
and public adoption proceedings in Massachusetts, regardless of where the child
resides prior to the adoption.53 Massachusetts General Laws, chapter 210 and
the Mohr decision govern the Commonwealth's private adoption agencies.' The

Department of Social Services (DSS), the Commonwealth's public adoption
agency, has the same restraints as private adoption agencies. DSS, however,
must also adhere to guidelines set forth in the Code of Massachusetts
Regulations (the Code). 5 The Code's provisions do not substantially alter the
legislative expectations of public agencies.' For example, under the General
Laws, information which will not identify the biological parents may be
disclosed to the adoptive parents upon their request.5 7 The Code similarly
requires the adoption agency to provide "relevant information" to the adoptive

"' Viccaro, 406 Mass. at 781-82, 551 N.E.2d at 11-12.
52Mohr v. Commonwealth, 421 Mass. 147, 155, 653 N.E.2d 1104 1109 (1995). See

also Deborah Miller, Are You Adopting a Child or a Heartache?Adoption Agencies may
have to Disclose or Face a Claim of Wrongful Adoption, 26 NEw ENG. L. REv. 1145, 1170
(1992) ("[because] the courts of Massachusetts are willing to grant recovery for the
extraordinary costs associated with raising an unwanted healthy child, then recovery for the
ordinary costs associated with raising an unhealthy desired child, naturally follows.")
'

MASS. GEN. L. ch.210, § 1-14; MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 110, § 7.200-7.214 (1993).

" MASS. GEN. L. ch. 210, § 1-14; MAss. REGS. CODE tit. 110, § 7.200-7.12;Mohr,
421 Mass. at 147, 653 N.E.2d. at 1104 (1995).
" See MASS. GEN. L. ch. 210, § 1-14; MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 110, § 7.200-7.12.;

Mohr, 421 Mass. at 147,653 N.E.2d. at 1104 (1995).
' Both MASS. GEN. L. ch. 210, § 1-14; MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 110, § 7.200-7.214
(1993) require the adoption agencies to disclose identical information.
57 MASS. GEN. L. ch. 210, § 5D(aX3) (1994). This statute defines nonidentifying

information as "medical, ethnic, socio-economic and educational circumstances." Id. This

information may only be released to the adoptive parents if the adopted person is under the
age of eighteen years. Id. If the adoptee is over the age of eighteen years, the adoption
agency may disclose the information only to the adoptee upon his or her written request.
MASS. GEN. L. ch. 210, § 5D(aXl) (1994).
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parents.58 The General Laws and the Code leave the dissemination of
information to the discretion of the agency.59
The major difference between private and public adoption agencies does not
lie in the respective disclosure requirements, but in the potential liability for
nondisclosure of information. The damage award in Mohr demonstrates that
public adoption agencies in Massachusetts are only liable up to $100,000 for
negligent misrepresentation of the adoptee's history.' The Mohr opinion notes
that had DSS intentionally misrepresented information about Elizabeth, the
damage award would have been different."
The court clarified that
discrepancies in damage awards depend on whether the agency is public or
private, and whether the employee acted negligently or intentionally.62 Although
the court did not speculate on damage awards for wrongful adoption cases
involving private agencies, a court resolving a wrongful adoption case in the
future may hand down a damage award which more accurately reflects the
foreseeable costs of child care.
V. POSSIBLE AVENUES OF RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL
ADOPTION IN MASSACHUSETTS
Massachusetts courts will probably follow the precedent set by Illinois,
New York, and Ohio and only allow recovery for 'wrongful adoption' based on
the theory of common law fraud or negligent misrepresentation.6 3 In the past,

I MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 110, § 7.213(3) (1993).
s9 MASS. GEN. L. ch. 210, § 5D(3) (stating that the "agency, in its discretion shall

release information surounding the circumstances under which the adopted person became
available for adoption"). Under this section of the Code, the public adoption agency gets
to label information "relevant" in aiding the adoptive parents in determining whether or not
to adopt a particular child. MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 110, § 7.213(3) (1993).

0See Mohr. v. Commonwealth, 421 Mass.. 147,149,653 N.E.2d 1104, 1106 (1995);
MASS. GEN. L. ch. 258, § 2 (1994). See Mohr, 421 Mass. at 155, 653 N.E.2d at 1109.
61 MASS. GEN. L. ch 258, § 10(c) (1994); Mohr, 421 Mass. at 164, 653 N.E.2d at
1113. The Massachusetts Tort Claims Act exempts public employees from liability except
where the employee's negligence harms a member of the public. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 258, §
2 (1994). The Tort Claims Act caps liability at $100,000. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 258, § 2
(1994).
62 Mohr, 421 Mass. at 164,653 N.E.2d at 1113.
63 See, e.g., Roe v. Catholic Charities, 225 Ill. App. 3d 519, 527, 588 N.E.2d 354,

359 (1992) (explaining that to be successful, adoptive parents must satisfy their burden of
proof on all the elements of fraud); Juman v. Louise Wise Servs., 620 N.Y.S.2d 371, 372
(1995) (describing wrongful death as "an exension of common law fraud to the adoption
setting"); Burr v. Board of County Comm'rs, 23 Ohio St. 3d 69, 72, 491 N.E.2d 1101,
1105 (1986) (lisitng elements of common law fraud in describing wrongful adoption).
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dissatisfied adoptive parents in other states have unsuccessfully sued adoption
agencies under the premise of breach of contract.' To date, however, courts
have yet to equate adoption with a contract because adoption lacks elements of
contract formation.6' Other adoptive parents have attempted to recover from
adoption agencies under a due process claim." In these cases, the adoptive
parents have also been denied relief because the courts have not equated
misrepresentation of the child's
background with a deprivation of a recognized
liberty or property right.67
Although adoptive parents may seek compensation by establishing a prima
facie case of common law fraud and misrepresentation, at least one proponent
of 'wrongful adoption' suggests that adoptive parents may also seek recovery
under statutory consumer protection laws." Under Massachusetts General Law,
chapter 93A (93A), plaintiffs can recover damages from parties conducting
fraudulent trade practices.69 To utilize 93A, future courts must consider the
" See, e.g., Richard P. v. Vista Del Mar Child Care Serv., 106 Cal. App. 3d. 860,
867-68, 165 Cal. Rptr. 370, 374 (1980) (dismissing breach of contract claim because a
physician cannot guarantee the child's future health at the time of the adoption); Roe, 225
Ill. App. 3d at 538, 588 N.E.2d at 366 (denying recovery on breach of contract claim
because complaint did not clearly indicate that adoption entailed an offer, acceptance, and
consideration); Allen v. Children's Servs., 58 Ohio App. 3d 41, 44, 567 N.E.2d 1346,
1349 (1990) (rejecting breach of contract claim because equating the adoption of a child
to a "bargained for exchange is repugnant" (quoting A.L. v. P.A., 213 N.J. Super. 391, 394,
517 A.2d 494,497 (1988)).
- Roe, 225 111. App. 3d at 538, 588 N.E.2d at 366, (stating that "facts sufficient to
indicate offer, acceptance and consideration" must precipitate contract damages quoting
Latex Glove Co. v. Gruen, 146 111. App. 3d 868, 873, 497 N.E.2d 466, 469 (1986))).
"Engstrom v. State, 461 N.W.2d 309, 312 (Iowa 1990) (attempting to hinge liability
on a due process violation among other complaints). Howard and Dorothy Engstrom,
pre-adoptive parents, claimed that the adoption agency deprived them of a liberty interest
in "personal and family integrity" by not realizing the child's biological father was alive at
the time the child was placed in the pre-adoptive home. Engstrom, 461 N.W.2d at 318.
67 Engstrom, 461 N.W.2d at 318-19. The court followed the
Fifth Circuit which
held that adoptive parents do not have a 'liberty' interest in learning information about their
adopted child. Id. at 319 (citing Griffith v. Johnson, 899 F.2d 1427, 1432 (5th Cir. 1990)).
The Engstroms also complained that the adoption agency deprived them of a property
interest, specifically the money they spent on the child before the State returned her to her
father. Id. at 319. The court again patterned the holding on the Fifth Circuit's reasoning
and found the claim 'tenuous' because the state did not force the pre-adoptive couple to
spend money on the child. Id.
' See Miller,supra note 52, at 1164 (arguing that the permanent placement of a child
should strictly be protected and regulated by the state).
MASS. GEN. L. ch. 93A, § 1(b) (1994). In pertinent part, the statute applies to the
"sale... of... any services ... and shall include any trade or commerce directly or
indirectly affecting the people of this commonwealth." Id. One could argue that the
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service surrounding the adoption procedure a trade or commerce, or the agency
itself a commercial entity. Only then would aggrieved adoptive parents fall
under the statutory protection of 93A, and qualify for double or treble the
amount of actual damages.7 Under 93A, Massachusetts courts may find parties
liable if their conduct is "undertaken... to destroy the rights of another.... ,"
Certainly some of the examples of the deceitful behavior of agencies in wrongful
adoption claims meet this standard.
Even though a successful 93A claim may provide money to care for the
child, it is doubtful that the Massachusetts legislature, or the courts, will expand
the protection to include adoptive parents. As it stands today, the Massachusetts
courts and legislature give more protection to purchasers of automobiles and
appliances than to people adopting a child.72
VI. MAKING MASSACHUSETTS A FORUM FOR HONEST ADOPTIONS
Present statutory regulations of adoptions attempt to serve the interests of

service, especially through private adoption agencies, of arranging child adoption falls under
the purview of 93A because it "directly... affect[s] the people of the Commonwealth." Id.
The court in Riseman v. Orion Research, Inc. held that the "definition of 'trade' and
'commerce' in G.L. c. 93A §1 (b)... is open-ended to a considerable degree because,
although it states certain activities that are included, it does not exclude other activities."
394 Mass. 311, 313, 475 N.E.2d 398, 399 (1985).
7 MASs. GEN. L. ch. 93A, § 9(3A) (1994); Riseman, 394 Mass. at 313, 475 N.E.2d
at 399.
7' Massachusetts Employers Ins. Exch. v. Propac-Mass. Inc., 420 Mass. 39, 43, 648
N.E.2d 435, 438 (1995). In its discussion of the standard of deceptive or unfair conduct,
the court found phrases such as "level of rascality" and "rancid flavor" unhelpful in
determining the "nature, purpose and effect of the conduct." MassachusettsEmployer's,
420 Mass. at 42, 648 N.E.2d at 438 (citing Levings v. Forbes & Wallace, Inc., 8 Mass.
App. Ct. 498, 504, 396 N.E.2d 149, 153 (1979) and Atkinson v. Rosenthal, 33
Mass.App.Ct. 219, 226, 598 N.E.2d 666, 670 (1992)); see also Brennan v. Carvel Corp.,
929 F.2d 801, 813 (1st Cir. 1991) (adding requirement that defendant's actions were
"immoral, unethical, oppressive or unscrupulous" for a finding of a 93A violation, and
referring to Quaker State Oil Refining Corp v. Garrity Oil Co., 884 F.2d 1510, 1513 (1st.
Cir. 1989)).
" See Miller, supra note 52, at 1164 (explaining the judicial interpretation of trade
or commerce). Interestingly, Massachusetts courts measure the business conduct in
question with that of "the commercial market place," not "an overly precious standard of
ethical or moral behavior." See Brennan v. Carvel Corp. 929 F.2d at 812-13 (quoting US
Corp. v. Arthur D. Little Soys. Inc., 28 Mass.App.Ct. 672, 679, 546 N.E.2d 888, 897
(1989)).
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biological parents, adoptive children, and adoptive families." Upon comparison
with the guidelines of other states, the Massachusetts adoption practice falls
short of providing the best system in several ways. First, the adoption laws of

Massachusetts lack explicit guidelines to ensure that adoptive parents obtain full
disclosure prior to the adoption.74 Second, the Commonwealth does not provide
appropriate remedies for families who adopt a child without knowledge of his or
her serious physical, mental, or emotional problems, and are unable to
adequately care for that child." This article suggests that fraudulent activity
involved in child adoptions would decrease if the Massachusetts legislature
demanded specific disclosures and offered appropriate remedies.
Honest communication between the adoptive parents and the adoption
agency has become increasingly more important for several reasons. First, the
number of healthy babies up for adoption has declined over the past twenty
years, forcing adoption agencies to push adoption of physically and mentally
handicapped children.76 Second, the number of children born addicted to illegal
substances or with Fetal Alcohol Syndrome has increased." Third, more readily
available abortions leave fewer healthy, desirable babies for adoption.7" The
fourth, and most important reason to mandate disclosure is that many of the
adopted babies do not show signs of a handicap until late childhood and

' See generally MASS. GEN. L. ch. 210 (1994) (repeating that the agency and court
consider childrens' best interests); 110 MASS. REG. CODE tit. § 7.205 (explaining the
stringent requirements to become an adoptive parent).
74 MAss. GEN. L. ch. 210, § 5D (outlining the lack of specificity the legislature
requires of the adoption agencies).
75 MASS. GEN. L. ch. 210, §1-14 (1994). Other states allow parents to annul the
adoption of a child when they no longer can parent their child. See infra note 99-101
(citing statutes on anullment of adoptions); Anne Harlan Howard, Note, Annulment of
Adoption Decrees on Petition ofAdoptive Parents,22 J. FAM. L. 519, 565 (1984) (listing

grounds and procedural requirements of states which allow annulment of adoption decrees).
' See Daniel Golden, When Adoption Doesn't Work, Boston Globe, June 11, 1989,

(Magazine) at 16 (tracing the trauma of several families in states that allow annulment after
discovering that their adopted child had a mental or physical illness). "The more physically
or emotionally disabled the child, the more likely is the adoption to fall apart .... [S]ome
children are adopted twice or even three times... [which] still may be preferable to living
in an institution, but it's ...far... from the government's hope of permanency." Id.
7 See Janet Hopkins Dickson, The EmergingRights ofAdoptive Parents:Substances
or Specter?, 38 UCLA L. REv. 917, 918, 944 (1991) (reporting on the increased infertility

rates among Americans and infants born with health problems due to inappropriate or
harmful neonatal care); see also Golden, supra note 76 (explaining the rise in adoptions
of "hard to adopt" older children due to abusive birth parents, foster parents and extended
stays at state-run institutions).
7 Dickson, supra note 77, at 918.
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adolescence.79 Full disclosure would allow the adoptive parents to provide
special medical treatment or education which could lessen the effect of the
child's handicap or even dissuade parents incapable of caring for such children
from pursuing the adoption."0
VII. STATUTORY REFORM
There are four areas of the Massachusetts adoption statute in need of
amendment. First, Massachusetts should rewrite its statute and follow states
such as Iowa, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee which emphasize their intent to
protect the welfare of the child during the adoption process."' Massachusetts
ensures that the adoptive parents will be able to provide for the child, but unlike
the analogous provisions of Iowa, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee, the
Massachusetts statute lacks language emphasizing the agencies' intent to
"provid[e] . . . a loving home," or insure the adoptees' interests remain
"paramount." 2 Similarly, the Code fails to direct the public adoption agencies
to focus on the welfare of the child. 3 The official comment to the Massachusetts
public adoption regulation states, however, that the "primary responsibility of
the Department ... [is] ... to find families for children, rather than to find
children for families.' 4 The legislature should amend the statute and mandate
that the child's needs and future care are of primary importance. This would
send a message to adoption agencies that they need not push children through the
adoption system, but work to create families which will remain intact.
A second fault with the Massachusetts statute lies in its permissive and

" See supra note 19 (listing cases where adoptive parents were not initially aware
of adoptees illnesses or handicaps.)
s M.H. and J.H. v. Caritas, 488 N.W.2d 282, 287 (1992) (highlighting the
importance of securing timely and appropriate medical care for the child as a reason for full
disclosure). Furthermore, adoptive parents should have the ability to control whether they

wish to accept responsibility for children that have been injured through poor neonatal care,
substance abuse, and hereditary diseases. Dickson, supra,note 77, at 943-44.
SI See IOWA CODE ANN. § 600.1 (West 1996) (interest of the adoptive child is the
most important aspect of the adoption process); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2902 (a) (1991)
(adoption decree will enter only if best interest of child satisfied); TENN. CODE ANN. §
36-1-101 (1991) (purpose of adoption is to protect and foster the well being of the child).
0 See IOWACODE ANN. § 600.1 (1996); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 210, § 6 (1994); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 36-1-101 (West 1996).
83 MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 110, § 7.205 (1993).

u Id. This comment implies that Massachusetts aims to place the needs of the
children before the preferences of the adopting parents, but does not ensure the goal of
keeping the child's interests of prima,-y importance.
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ambiguous wording. Unlike other states, Massachusetts ambiguously describes
what information the agency may disclose to the parent."5 No where does the
statute mandate disclose of any information. 6 Since the judiciary has imposed
an "affirmative duty" on adoption agencies to disclose information to adoptive
parents, the legislature should now specify exactly the information private and
public agencies must divulge.' Exact disclosure requirements would benefit the
adoptive parents by informing them of every detail the agency knows, and it
would also help the parents realize that the agency does not know everything
about the child.
To ameliorate the ambiguity of the statute, Massachusetts should mirror the
Texas statute, which requires specific information to be passed on to the parents,
but also will not allow a court to grant an adoption decree unless the court has
notice that the adoptive parents have a copy of a comprehensive medical report.8
In contrast, Massachusetts adoption agencies may release "medical information,"
but potential adoptive parents do not have rights to all medical history. 9
Other states, such as New York, mandate the disclosure of hereditary
conditions, diseases, and information about drugs or medication taken by the
mother during pregnancy.9 Similarly, Texas and Oregon require adoption
agencies to disclose a detailed medical history, a full description of the parents'
physical characteristics and "[a]ny other useful or unusual biological

a Supra note 11, Mass. Gen. L. ch. 210, § 5D (1994); see MASS. PEGS CODE tit. 110,
§ 7.213 (1993) (stating adoption agency may release "information... concerning the
medical, ethnic, socio-economic and educational" circumstances of the child); cf TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.032 (a)-(I) (West 1996). The Texas statute explicitly requires
disclosure of medical, psychological, psychiatric, and dental histories, a record of
immunization, and the available results of the medical, psychological, psychiatric and,
dental examinations of the child. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.032(b) (West 1996). This
statute also requires disclosure of information about the nuclear and extended family. TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.032(c) (West 1996). Moreover, the duty to disclose information
about the child does not end with the finalization of the adoption because the statute
requires the adoption agency to disclose supplemental information to the adoption parents
if it becomes available. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.032(1) (West 1996).
See supra note 11, Mass. Gen. L. ch. 210, § 5D (1994).
Mohr v. Commonwealth, 421 Mass. 147, 161,653 N.E.2d 1104, 1112 (1995).
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.032 (a)-(e), (h) (West 1996). Butcf MASS. GEN. L.
ch. 210 § 5D(3) (requiring parents to request information about their adoptive child in

writing).
89 MASS. GEN. L. ch. 210, § 5D (1994). But cf OR. REv. STAT. § 109.342(2Xe)
(1993) (requiring disclosure of specific medical information and also "any other useful or
unusual... information" provided by the biological parents).

90N.Y. Soc. SERV.

LAW

§ 373-a (McKinney 1992).
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information."' While these examples of stringent legislation do not guarantee
perfect adoptions, these laws effectively put the adoptive parents on notice of
possible medical, physical, or emotional problems.92
The third problem with the Massachusetts statute is that it gives adoption
agencies full discretion in deciding what information to pass on to the adoptive
parents.9 a This policy harms adoptive children and their parents in three ways.
First, the adoption agency needs to spend resources deciding what information
should be disclosed when the resources could be better spent preparing both the
child and parent for the adoption.94 Second, this policy forces the adoption
agency to screen information and decide which details merit disclosure.9 5
Massachusetts lawmakers should again look to the Texas regulation which
allows "editing" for the purposes of protecting the confidentiality of the
biological parents, but gives the agency little discretion in deciding what to
disclose.'
The third problem surfaces after the finalization of the adoption, because
the adoption agencies in Massachusetts have no commitment to the newly
formed family. The relationship between the state, or the private agency, and the
family terminates. 9 Other states require the agency to update the family with

9' SeeOR.REv. STAT. § 109.342(2) (1993); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.032 (a)-(e)
(West 1996).
9 See Michael J. v. County of Los Angeles, Dep't of Adoptions, 201 Cal. App. 3d
859, 875, 247 Cal. Rptr. 504, 513 (1988) (emphasizing that adoption agencies are only
liable for fraudulent misrepresentation and cannot be considered as a guarantor of the
child's future good health); Richard P. v. Vista Del Mar Child Care Service, 106 Cal. App.
3d 860,866, 165 Cal. Rptr. 370, 373 (1980) (holding that imposing liability for negligence
or intentional misrepresentation would effectively make an adoption agency a guarantor of
the child's future good health); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 373-a (McKinney 1992); OR. REV.
STAT. § 109. 342(2) (1993); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.032 (a)-(l) (West 1996); see also
D. Marianne Brower Blair, Gettng the Whole Truth and Nothing But the Truth: The Limits
ofLiabilityFor WrongfulAdoption, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 851, 877 (1992) (discussing
the benefits of a strict disclosure rule).
93 MAss. GEN. L. ch. 210, § 5D (1994); cf S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1780 (D) (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1994) (stating the executive officer of the adoption agency has sole discretion
to determine information adopting parents learn of adoptive child's background).

See Fred S. Wilson, Wrongful Adoption: A Guide to Impending Tort Litigation in
Texas, 24 ST. MARY'S L. J. 273, 291 (1992) (emphasizing potential dangers of making
adoption agency discern information for adoptive parents).
93 Id.

" TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.032 (f) (West 1996).
97 MASS. GEN. L. ch. 210, § 6A (1995). There is no mandate to update the adoptive
family with new information they may discover. Id.
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any new information it learns about the child or biological parents.9 This
requirement would insure the adoptive parents that they have complete
knowledge of all information known about their adopted child's physical and
mental health.
VIII. APPROPRIATE REMEDIES
Providing appropriate remedies for successful wrongful adoption
complainants would encourage open communication between adoption agencies
and adoptive parents. One possible remedy is to allow courts to annul or
abrogate the adoption decree. If the court annulled the adoption, the child would
presumably return to the agency which would be left to arrange appropriate care
for the child. Another possible remedy is to increase the amount of money that
the parents can collect from adoption agencies. Even though these remedies
force adoptive parents into litigation, both remedies work in the best interest of
the child by providing funding for necessary medical treatment and educational
services. Furthermore, these remedies act as a deterrent since agencies found to
have intentionally or negligently misrepresented information would have to fund
the services the child requires.
A. Annulment as a Remedy
Massachusetts, like many other states, has no annulment statute. The
courts have implied power to grant annulments if necessary. 99 Other states allow
TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.032 (1) (West 1996). Both state and private agencies
must supplement their own files with new information and disclose new information to the
adoptive family. Id. The statute imposes this relationship for ninety nine years. TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 16.032(h) (West 1996).
" MASS. GEN. L. ch. 210, § 6 (1994); Petition For Revocation of a Judgment For
Adoption of A Minor, 393 Mass. 556, 562-63,471 N.E.2d 1348, 1353 (1984) (stating that
Massachusetts probate courts look to the best interest of the child in deciding whether or
not to vacate an adoption decree). The following statutes do not specifically allow
annulment, but give courts implied power to annul adoptions: CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
46b-102, 46b-121 (West 1995); GA. CODE. ANN..§ 19-8-14 (1983); IDAHO CODE § 15-1605
(Supp. 1984); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 1517 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-85); IND. CODE
ANN. § 31-3-1-8 (West 1980); IOWACODE ANN. § 600.12, § 600.13 (West 1996); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 59-2213 (1995); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:438 (West 1991); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 710.64 (West 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259. 28 (West Supp. 1985); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 453. 080 (Vernon 1986); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-8-127 (1995); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 127. 180 (1993); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-56 (West 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
40-7A-7 (Michie 1994); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 114 (McKinney 1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 10, § 60.19 (West1987); OR REV. STAT. § 109. 381 (1993); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 2102 (Purdon Supp. 1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-21-1 (1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 25-6-6 (1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-9 (1992); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.33. 240
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annulments for two reasons, either jurisdictional or procedural defects,"o or
failure of the agency to disclose a mental or physical handicap at the time of the
adoption.'"o States which allow annulments due to procedural defects appear to
enforce seemingly strict time limitations, but often grant annulments petitioned
for after the statutory time limit expired."(c The states which allow annulments
based on the fraudulent behavior of the adoption agency usually have a time
restriction, but allow annulments if the manifested disability resulted from a
pre-adoption condition not revealed to the parents." 3 This type of statute best
serves the interests of children.
While critics of these statutes complain that they encourage dismantling
families, annulment provisions ensure of the truthfulness of an agency's
statements and also deter agencies from falsifying information about the child. 4"
The Massachusetts legislature should take the advantages of these statutes into
consideration if it reforms the Commonwealth's adoptions regulations. If it
decides to implement an annulment provision, it should specify strict time
limitations and only allow for annulment in cases of fraud or misrepresentation,
not for divorce or separation of the adoptive parents.

(West 1996); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48. 911 (West 1979); WYO. STAT. § 1-22-101-116 (1995).
10wALA.

CODE § 26-10A-26 (1992); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-123 (1974); COLO.

REV. STAT. § 19-5-214 (1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 918 (1993); D.C. CODE ANN. §
16-310 (1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.182 (West 1985); MD. CODE ANN.,[FA1MLY] § 330
(1991); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-17-15, 17 (1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-2-607 (1995);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-127 (1984).
101ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.140 (1995); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-216 (Michie 1993);
CAL. [FAMILY] CODE § 9100 (West 1994); HAw. REV. STAT. § 578-12 (1993); KY. REV.
STAT. § 199.540 (Michie 1995); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 43-1136 (West 1995);
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 170-B: 17 (1994); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-15-15 (1991); OHIo REV.
CODE ANN. § 3107.17 (Anderson 1989); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 162.012 (West 1991);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 454 (1974); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-237 (Michie 1995); W. VA.
CODE § 48-4-12 (Supp. 1995).
" See generally supra note 100 (state statutes which allow annulment for
jurisdictional or procedural defect).

"oSee generallysupra note 101 (state statutes which allow annulment of adoption
if the adoption agency does not disclose information about a child's mental and physical
health).
' See Elizabeth N. Can'ol, Abrogation ofAdoption by Adoptive Parents, 19 FAM.
L.Q. 155, 169 (1985). Most statutes provide that if the parent proves fraud or
misrepresentation occurred within a definite amount of time, the state can annul the
adoption. See generally CAL. [FAMILY] CODE § 9100 (West 1994). The California statute
allowing for annulment has come under fire because it requires the adoptive parents to prove
the child's unadaptable status. CAL. [FAMILY] CODE § 9100(a) (West 1994). Proof of fraud
does not necessarily help the child because the child may be stigmatized 'handicapped' and
less attractive to other adoptive parents. Id.
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The cases in which the Supreme Judicial Court allowed annulment involve
a situation where one of the adoptive parents unduly influenced the other to

adopt a child."5 The other annulment petitions involve situations in which the
natural parents or guardians decide to keep the child after finalization of the
adoption decree.Y In these cases, the court determined whether or not to annul
the adoption by looking at the best interests of the child.'0 7
In contrast, states such as California permit the annulment adoption decrees
if the agency fails to inform the parents about a mental or emotional disability
prior to the adoption." In these cases, the child returns to the adoption agency,
which becomes financially responsible for the treatment and education of the
child or tries place the child with another adoptive family."° While this remedy
breaks a family apart, it serves one of the child's interests by providing a source
of appropriate medical treatment and education. The Massachusetts adoption
regulations do not outright forbid annulments in these circumstances, courts may
grant annulments more readily if the legislature specifically provided this option.
B. HigherDamage Awards
The other possible remedy, forcing the fraudulent adoption agency to pay
for the child's medical and education expenses while the child remains with the
adoptive parents, remains speculative. The only successful wrongful adoption
case in Massachusetts involved a public agency, which receives protection from
exorbitantly high damage awards by the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act."0 If

,0S Phillips v. Chase, 203 Mass. 556, 566, 89 N.E. 1049, 1053 (1909) (decree of
adoption set aside because it was granted in a scheme to inherit property). As part of the
holding, the Phillips court stated that "a wrongdoer will not be allowed to profit by his own
fraud .... Phillips,203 Mass. at 556, 89 N.E. at 1053.
'0' Revocation of a Judgment For Adoption of A Minor, 393 Mass. 556, 562-63, 471
N.E.2d 1348, 1353 (1984); see also Adoption of a Minor, 350 Mass. 302, 304, 214 N.E.2d
281, 282 (adoptive parent unsuccessfully attempts to annul adoption after their adopted
daughter is raped).
7 See Revocation of a Judgment For Adoption of A Minor, 393 Mass. at 563, 471
N.E.2d. at 1353 (deciding that even though the inatemal grandmother had no notice of the
adoption the best interest of the child did not warrant the adoption annulment).
108CAL. [FAMILY] CODE § 9100 (West 1994). The California statute states that the

child must be rendered "unadaptable" due to mental or emotional disabilities. Id. The
Califomia legislature only grants a five-year statute of limitations. CAL. [FAMILY] CODE §
9100(b) (West 1994).
CAL. [FAMILY] CODE § 9100(b) (West 1994).
"0 Mohr v. Commonwealth, 421 Mass. 147, 164, 653 N.E.2d 1104, 1113. One of
119

the issues on appeal in Cohen was the high damage amount rendered by the Bristol County
Superior Court. Id.
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a lawsuit involving a private agency arose, however, a Massachusetts trial court
may assess the damages using the standards of Viccaro and Burke."' The trial
courts resolving those cases based the damages on the actual amount needed to
cover the high medical and education costs the parents would incur in raising
their children." 2 Additionally, the plaintiffs in these cases recovered damages
3
for the emotional stress resulting from the negligence of the defendants."
Massachusetts law makes parents responsible for the support of an adult
child if he or she suffers an impairment and cannot live independently.'" With
this in mind, adoptive parents should be able to pass the costs associated with
raising disabled children to the adoption agency if the agency fraudulently
induced the adoption. Another related possibility is to amend the Massachusetts
Tort Claims Act and exempt DSS from protection in high damage awards
resulting from wrongful adoption lawsuits. Again, without the protection of the
Massachusetts Tort Claims Act, the damage award would reflect the true costs
of maintaining the wrongfully adopted child.
IX. CONCLUSION
In light of the Mohr's plight and the rise of both hard to adopt and disabled
children in the custody of DSS, the Massachusetts legislature should amend the
Commonwealth's adoption regulations. By forcing adoption agencies to
truthfidly disclose all the information known to them about children they place,
adoptive families will more likely stay intact, and children will have a better
chance of being adopted. If a sense of helping children does not sway the

"' See Viccaro v. Milunsky, 406 Mass. 777, 781-82, 551 N.E.2d 8, 11-12 (1990)
(damages represented the estimated amount of money the parents would spend on the
child's medical care and education); Burke v. Rivo, 406 Mass. 764, 768, 551 N.E.2d 1, 5
(1990) (determining damage award by assessing costs the court considers "reasonably
foreseeable" in raising a particular child).
12 Viccaro, 406 Mass. at 781-82, 551 N.E.2d at 8; Burke, 406 Mass. at 768, 551

N.E.2d at 5. In Burke, the court allowed the couple to recover all costs "directly flowing"
from the pregnancy and birth such as the wife's lost salary and earning capacity, the cost
of delivery and care following the birth, day care for the other children while the mother

was in the hospital, and the second sterilization. Id. The court did not object to adding on
damages for the wife's pain and suffering connected with the pregnancy, delivery and
sterilization procedure. Id. Additionally, the court awarded the couple damages for the
emotional distress caused by the unwanted pregnancy. Id.
"3 Viccaro, 406 Mass. at 781-82, 551 N.E.2d at 8 (1990); Burke, 406 Mass. at 768,
551 N.E.2d at 5.
"4 Feinberg v. Diamant, 378 Mass. 131, 133, 389 N.E.2d 998, 1000 (1979)
(explaining the denial of a petition by parents to revoke order to support a mentally
handicapped son).
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legislature, perhaps a financial argument would convince the government to
tighten the adoption laws in Massachusetts. Requiring disclosure would save
resources previously spent in litigation and many children would receive needed
medical and educational services much earlier.
Katherine T. Land

